Publications
Improving security at the system-call boundary in a type-safe operating system
January 1, 2018
Thesis
Published in:
Thesis (M.E.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018.
Topic:
R&D group:
Summary
Historically, most approaches to operating sytems security aim to either protect the kernel (e.g., the MMU) or protect user applications (e.g., W exclusive or X). However, little study has been done into protecting the boundary between these layers. We describe a vulnerability in Tock, a type-safe operating system, at the system-call boundary. We then introduce a technique for providing memory safety at the boundary between userland and the kernel in Tock. We demonstrate that this technique works to prevent against the aforementioned vulnerability and a class of similar vulnerabilities, and we propose how it might be used to protect against simliar vulnerabilities in other operating systems.
Summary
Historically, most approaches to operating sytems security aim to either protect the kernel (e.g., the MMU) or protect user applications (e.g., W exclusive or X). However, little study has been done into protecting the boundary between these layers. We describe a vulnerability in Tock, a type-safe operating system, at the...
READ MORE