Publications
Encounter modeling for sense and avoid deployment
May 5, 2008
Conference Paper
Published in:
2008 Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Surveillence Conf., 5-7 May 2008.
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Summary
Integrating unmanned aircraft into civil airspace requires the development and certification of systems for sensing and avoiding other aircraft. Because such systems are typically very complex and a high-level of safety must be maintained, rigorous analysis is required before they can be certified for operational use. As part of the certification process, collision avoidance systems need to be evaluated across millions of randomly generated close encounters that are representative of actual operations. New encounter models are under development that capture changes that have occurred in U.S. airspace since earlier models were developed in the 1980s and 1990s. These models capture the characteristics of small, General Aviation aircraft that may not be receiving Air Traffic Control services as well as typically larger aircraft that are squawking a discrete transponder code. Both models allow dynamic changes in airspeed, vertical rates, and turn rates in a way that was not possible previously. This paper describes the process used to construct the encounter models, how the models may be used in the development of sense-and-avoid systems for unmanned aircraft, and their application in an analysis of an electro-optical system for collision avoidance.
Summary
Integrating unmanned aircraft into civil airspace requires the development and certification of systems for sensing and avoiding other aircraft. Because such systems are typically very complex and a high-level of safety must be maintained, rigorous analysis is required before they can be certified for operational use. As part of the...
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Elementary surveillance (ELS) and enhanced surveillance (EHS) validation via Mode S secondary radar surveillance
April 25, 2008
Project Report
Published in:
MIT Lincoln Laboratory Report ATC-337
Summary
Several applications of the Mode S data link are currently being implemented and equipage requirements have been issued in countries around the world. Elementary surveillance (ELS) and enhanced surveillance (EHS) applications have been mandated in Europe with full equipage of all aircraft in the airspace required by 2009. Exemptions to the ELS requirement include aircraft that will be out of service by 31 December 2009, and aircraft undergoing flight-testing, delivery, or transit into or out of maintenance bases. Transport type aircraft (defined as having a maximum take-off weight in excess of 250 knots) are to be equipped to support ELS and EHS. Exemptions to the requirements for EHS include those listed above for ELS and: a- fighter and training aircraft; b- rotary-wing aircraft; c- existing/older transport type aircraft undergoing avionics upgrades which will then support ELS/EHS; and d- aircraft types granted special exemptions (e.g., B1-B, B2-A, and B-52H bombers). [not complete]
Summary
Several applications of the Mode S data link are currently being implemented and equipage requirements have been issued in countries around the world. Elementary surveillance (ELS) and enhanced surveillance (EHS) applications have been mandated in Europe with full equipage of all aircraft in the airspace required by 2009. Exemptions to...
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The next-generation multimission U.S. surveillance radar network
November 1, 2007
Journal Article
Published in:
Bull. American Meteorological Society, Vol. 88, No. 11, November 2007, pp. 1739-1751.
Summary
Current U.S. weather and aircraft surveillance radar networks vary in age from 10 to more than 40 years. Ongoing sustainment and upgrade programs can keep these operating in the near to mid-term, but the responsible agencies National Weather Service (NWS), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Departments of Defense (DoD) and Homeland Security (DHS) recognize that large-scale replacement activities must begin during the next decade. The National Weather Radar Testbed (NWRT) in Norman, Oklahoma, is a multiagency project demonstrating operational weather measurements capability enhancements that could be realized using electronically steered phased-array radars as a replacement for the current Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler (WSR-88D). FAA support for the NWRT and related efforts address air traffic control (ATC) and homeland defense surveillance missions that could be simultaneously accomplished using the agile-beam capability of a phased array weather radar network. In this paper, we discuss technology issues, operational considerations, and cost trades associated with the concept of replacing current national surveillance radars with a single network of multimission phased array radars (MPAR). We begin by describing the current U.S. national weather and aircraft surveillance radar networks and their technical parameters. The airspace coverage and surveillance capabilities of these existing radars provide a starting point for defining requirements for the next-generation airspace surveillance system. We next describe a conceptual MPAR high-level system design and our initial development and testing of critical subsystems. This work, in turn, has provided a solid basis for estimating MPAR costs for comparison with existing, mechanically scanned operational surveillance radars. To assess the numbers of MPARs that would need to be procured, we present a conceptual MPAR network configuration that duplicates airspace coverage provided by current operational radars. Finally, we discuss how the improved surveillance capabilities of MPAR could be utilized to more effectively meet the weather and aircraft surveillance needs of U.S. civil and military agencies.
Summary
Current U.S. weather and aircraft surveillance radar networks vary in age from 10 to more than 40 years. Ongoing sustainment and upgrade programs can keep these operating in the near to mid-term, but the responsible agencies National Weather Service (NWS), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Departments of Defense (DoD)...
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Analysis of ground surveillance assets to support Global Hawk airspace access at Beale Air Force Base
August 10, 2007
Project Report
Published in:
Project Report ATC-335, MIT Lincoln Laboratory
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Summary
This study, performed from May 2006 to January 2007 by MIT Lincoln Laboratory, investigated the feasibility of providing ground-sensor-based traffic data directly to Global Hawk operators at Beale AFB. The system concept involves detecting and producing tracks for all cooperative (transponder-equipped) and non-cooperative aircraft from the surface to 18,000 ft MSL, extending from the Beale AFB Class C airspace cylinder northward to the China Military Operations Area (MOA). Data from multiple sensors can be fused together to create a comprehensive air surveillance picture, with the altitudes of non-cooperative targets estimated by fusing returns from all available sensor data. Such a capability, if accepted by the FAA, could mitigate the need for Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR) to satisfy Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) requirements. There are no existing specifications for ground-sensor-based Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) traffic avoidance procedures, nor is it yet known how precisely altitude needs to be estimated. It may be possible to avoid traffic laterally, in which case traffic altitude need not be known accurately. If, however, it is necessary to also avoid traffic vertically, then altitudes will need to be estimated to some (as yet undefined) level of accuracy.
Summary
This study, performed from May 2006 to January 2007 by MIT Lincoln Laboratory, investigated the feasibility of providing ground-sensor-based traffic data directly to Global Hawk operators at Beale AFB. The system concept involves detecting and producing tracks for all cooperative (transponder-equipped) and non-cooperative aircraft from the surface to 18,000 ft...
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Macroscopic workload model for estimating en route sector capacity
July 2, 2007
Conference Paper
Published in:
USA/Europe ATM Seminar, 2-5 July 2007.
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Summary
Under ideal weather conditions, each en route sector in an air traffic management (ATM) system has a certain maximum operational traffic density that its controller team can safely handle with nominal traffic flow. We call this the design capacity of the sector. Bad weather and altered flow often reduce sector capacity by increasing controller workload. We refer to sector capacity that is reduced by such conditions as dynamic capacity. When operational conditions cause workload to exceed the capability of a sector's controllers, air traffic managers can respond either by reducing demand or by increasing design capacity. Reducing demand can increase aircraft operating costs and impose delays. Increasing design capacity is usually accomplished by assigning more control resources to the airspace. This increases the cost of ATM. To ensure full utilization of the dynamic capacity and efficient use of the workforce, it is important to accurately characterize the capacity of each sector. Airspace designers often estimate sector capacity using microscopic workload simulations that model each task imposed by each aircraft. However, the complexities of those detailed models limit their real-time operational use, particularly in situations in which sector volumes or flow directions must adapt to changing conditions. To represent design capacity operationally in the United States, traffic flow managers define an acceptable peak traffic count for each sector based on practical experience. These subjective thresholds-while usable in decision-making-do not always reflect the complexity and geometry of the sectors, nor the direction of the traffic flow. We have developed a general macroscopic workload model to quantify the workload impact of traffic density, sector geometry, flow direction, and air-to-air conflict rates. This model provides an objective basis for estimating design capacity. Unlike simulation models, this analytical approach easily extrapolates to new conditions and allows parameter validation by fitting to observed sector traffic counts. The model quantifies coordination and conflict workload as well as observed relationships between sector volume and controller efficiency. The model can support real-time prediction of changes in design capacity when traffic is diverted from nominal routes. It can be used to estimate residual airspace capacity when weather partially blocks a sector. Its ability to identify dominant manual workload factors can also help define the benefits and effectiveness of alternative concepts for automating labor-intensive tasks.
Summary
Under ideal weather conditions, each en route sector in an air traffic management (ATM) system has a certain maximum operational traffic density that its controller team can safely handle with nominal traffic flow. We call this the design capacity of the sector. Bad weather and altered flow often reduce sector...
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Guidance material for Mode S-specific protocol application avionics
June 4, 2007
Project Report
Published in:
MIT Lincoln Laboratory Report ATC-334
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Summary
This ATC report presents guidance material for the use of "Ground-Initiated Comm. B" (GICB) register set contained in a Mode S transponder. The guidance material is intended to provide assistance for implementers of Mode S avionics installations. A common summary of the requirements and specifications for Mode S GICB transponder register data link applications is developed. While this ATC report focuses primarily on the "Elementary Surveillance" (ELS), "Enhanced Surveillance" (EHS), and "Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast" (ADS-B) applications, guidance information is also provided for general transponder configuration and architecture of other Mode S functions employing the GICB register set. Although the information contained in this ATC report is drawn from a number of approved national and international standards, it is not intended to replace or supersede those standards documents. In the event of a conflict or contradiction between this ATC report and any approved standards (see references 1 through 6), the approved standard takes precedence and the reader is encouraged to contact the authors of this document. Reference 4 is the most-recent and complete specification for the Mode S register contents. For ease of reference, the relevant Mode S register images have been duplicated in Appendix A of this report.
Summary
This ATC report presents guidance material for the use of "Ground-Initiated Comm. B" (GICB) register set contained in a Mode S transponder. The guidance material is intended to provide assistance for implementers of Mode S avionics installations. A common summary of the requirements and specifications for Mode S GICB transponder...
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Enhanced regional situational awareness
June 1, 2007
Journal Article
Published in:
Lincoln Laboratory Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 2007, pp. 355-380.
Summary
Airspace protection in the capital area is provided by an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) created through the coordinated response of U.S. government and local law-enforcement agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Capitol Police. The IADS includes U.S. Coast Guard helicopters, fighter aircraft, and airborne early-warning aircraft cued by surveillance radars. Under Operation Noble Eagle, the response to a threat includes warning flares deployed from fighter aircraft and, ultimately, the use of surface and air-launched missiles. Selecting the appropriate response requires a means for rapidly assessing the aircraft threat. New and existing sensors must be simultaneously cued to the target of interest and integrated with existing sources of information to display a common-air-picture display to support the decision makers. This article describes the development of an Enhanced Regional Situation Awareness system, an integrated sensing and decision support system developed for the complex and busy airspace surrounding the National Capital Region.
Summary
Airspace protection in the capital area is provided by an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) created through the coordinated response of U.S. government and local law-enforcement agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Capitol Police. The IADS includes U.S. Coast...
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The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
June 1, 2007
Journal Article
Published in:
Lincoln Laboratory Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 2007, pp. 277-296.
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Summary
The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) has had extraordinary success in reducing the risk of mid-air collisions. Now mandated on all large transport aircraft, TCAS has been in operation for more than a decade and has prevented several catastrophic accidents. TCAS is a unique decision support system in the sense that it has been widely deployed (on more than 25,000 aircraft worldwide) and is continuously exposed to a high-tempo, complex air traffic system. TCAS is the product of carefully balancing and integrating sensor characteristics, tracker and aircraft dynamics, maneuver coordination, operational constraints, and human factors in time-critical situations. Missed or late threat detections can lead to collisions, and false alarms may cause pilots to lose trust in the system and ignore alerts, underscoring the need for a robust system design. Building on prior experience, Lincoln Laboratory recently examined potential improvements to the TCAS algorithms and monitored TCAS activity in the Boston area. Now the Laboratory is pursuing new collision avoidance technologies for unmanned aircraft.
Summary
The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) has had extraordinary success in reducing the risk of mid-air collisions. Now mandated on all large transport aircraft, TCAS has been in operation for more than a decade and has prevented several catastrophic accidents. TCAS is a unique decision support system in...
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Surveillance improvement algorithms for Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) at Dallas-Fort Worth Airport
April 20, 2007
Project Report
Published in:
MIT Lincoln Laboratory Report ATC-333
Summary
Operational testing of the Runway Status Lights (RWSL) system at the Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) airport has detected a number of cases where faults in the ASDE-X/DFW surveillance data have led to erroneous operation of the status lights. Among the surveillance problems noted during testing at DFW were: (a) false tracks, (b) track positional jumps to false locations, (c) Mode S track splits, (d) ATCRBS track splits, (e) invalid Mode C altitudes, (f) invalid track velocities, and (g) spurious Mode 3/a 06078 code tracks. The RWSL surveillance improvement algorithms package in this document is placed between the ASDE-X/DFW surveillance data source and the RESL safety logic. The surveillance improvement algorithms perform a variety of reasonableness and consistency checks on the input data and set validity flags and report status values for each input report which are then passed on to the RWSL safety logic. These flags and status values allow the RWSL to ignore erroneous reports and to avoid using questionable report components in the subsequent RWSL logic. This document illustrates the performance of the RWSL surveillance improvement algorithms package with examples from DFW analysis. It is shown that the RWSL surveillance improvement algorithms package substantially reduces the impact of the known ASDE-X/DFW surveillance anomalies on the performance of the RWSL safety logic. The RWSL surveillance improvement algorithms package may also host future algorithms necessary to mitigate further problems that might be detected in the surveillance data.
Summary
Operational testing of the Runway Status Lights (RWSL) system at the Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) airport has detected a number of cases where faults in the ASDE-X/DFW surveillance data have led to erroneous operation of the status lights. Among the surveillance problems noted during testing at DFW were: (a) false tracks...
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Multifunction phased array radar: technical synopsis, cost implications, and operational capabilities
January 14, 2007
Conference Paper
Published in:
87th Annual American Meteorological Society Meeting, 14-18 January 2007.
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Summary
Current U.S. weather and aircraft surveillance radar networks vary in age from 10 to more than 40 years. Ongoing sustainment and upgrade programs can keep these operating in the near to mid term, but the responsible agencies (FAA, NWS and DoD/DHS) recognize that large-scale replacement activities must begin during the next decade. In addition, these agencies are re-evaluating their operational requirements for radar surveillance. FAA has announced that next generation air traffic control (ATC) will be based on Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) (Scardina, 2002) rather than current primary and secondary radars. ADS-B, however, requires verification and back-up services which could be provided by retaining or replacing primary ATC radars.
Summary
Current U.S. weather and aircraft surveillance radar networks vary in age from 10 to more than 40 years. Ongoing sustainment and upgrade programs can keep these operating in the near to mid term, but the responsible agencies (FAA, NWS and DoD/DHS) recognize that large-scale replacement activities must begin during the...
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